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MARKET FAILURE AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:
A RESPONSE TO PROFESSOR LUNNEY
WENDY

J. GORDON*

Professor Lunney's piece in this volume 1 is interesting enough that I forgive
him for misportraying my own work. In this short reply I will clarify my
position, and then examine both the place of my market failure argument and
the place of some of Professor Lunney's arguments within the future of
Intellectual Property scholarship as a whole.
Professor Lunney describes a narrow interpretation of my market failure
analysis. 2 He is not alone. For some reason, it has become standard for
economically-oriented commentators to state that the accepted interpretation of
copyright's "fair use" doctrine is to see fair use as responding to high
transaction costs between copyright owner and user. It has also has become
standard to cite me for that limiting proposition, 3 and to suggest, further, that
my logic could lead to eliminating fair use where transaction costs between
owner and user became low enough that negotiations can occur. 4
Yet the point of my original article was not to limit fair use. Admittedly, I
suggested a strong limit to fair use in the third part of my test-the substantial

• Professor of Law and Paul J. Liacos Scholar in Law, Boston University School of Law.
Copyright© 2002 by Wendy J. Gordon.
1
Glynn S. Lunney, Fair Use and Market Failure: Sony Revisited, 82 B.U. L. REV. 975
(2002).
2 He focuses primarily on my first article in the field, Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as
Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and its
Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600 (1982) [hereinafter Fair Use as Market Failure].
3
An example (with an ameliorating footnote) is Robert P. Merges, The End of Friction?
Property Rights and Contract in the "Newtonian" World of On-Line Commerce, 12
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 115, 130-34 (1997). Merges describes transaction-cost barriers
between owners and users as having become "the prevailing view" of fair use, but notes that
"[i]n all fairness, a re-reading of Gordon's article makes quite clear that this was only one of
her chief insights." Id. at 130 n.52.
4
See, e.g., Tom W. Bell, Fair Use vs. Fared Use: The Impact of Automated Rights
Management on Copyright's Fair Use Doctrine, 76 N.C. L. REV. 557, 584 n.129 (1998).
For counter-arguments to Bell, see, e.g., Lydia Pallas Loren, Redefining The Market Failure
Approach to Fair Use in an Era of Copyright Permission Systems, 5 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1
(1997) (argument focused on market failure); Julie E. Cohen, A Right to Read Anonymously:
A Closer Look at "Copyright Management" in Cyberspace, 28 CONN. L. REV. 981 {1996)
(privacy argument).
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injury hurdle. 5 I now think I was wrong to posit such a broad and stringent
component to my proposed test and have recently argued that a showing of
substantial injury should bar fair use for only a subclass of cases. 6 However,
the substantial injury hurdle is not the issue before us now: We are looking at
the market failure aspect of my analysis. As to that aspect, the goal was not to
limit fair use, but quite the opposite.
The article aimed to show that the Court of Appeals for Ninth Circuit had
been wrong to place all non-transformative uses-particularly, exact copying
by consumers-outside the possibility of fair use. 7 To show that the Ninth
Circuit's view limiting fair use to "productive" or transformative uses was
overly narrow, I sought to illuminate a more persuasive rationale. The logic I
proposed was one that asked, "Is there some reason we cannot be confident
that deferring to a copyright owner's self-interested decision will also serve
social goals?" If such a reason appeared, then it might make sense for a judge
to refuse to defer to a copyright owner's veto, and instead make an
independent determination as to whether the defendant's use should go
forward. The resulting logic of market failure was not only descriptive of case
results, but sensible from a policy perspective as well.
My methodology involved reviewing the role that market failure plays in
ordinary law, 8 and then turning to a set of fact patterns well recognized as
favoring fair use and showing that they corresponded to forms of market
failure. 9 Once the reader understood how market failure illuminated various
legal doctrines, she could better understand why non-creative copying (of the
kind done by teachers who make photocopies for class, students who copy
passages while note-taking and consumers who make copies with their VCR's
and computers) might also be eligible for fair use ifmarket failures appeared.
As an example of how market failure illuminates an aspect of traditional fair
use law, consider the preference the fair use doctrine shows for the educational
user. From an economic perspective, the preference can be explained in part
5 See Gordon, Fair Use as Market F ai!ure, supra note 2, at 1618-22. My suggested test
had three parts: "Fair use should be awarded to the defendant in a copyright infringement
action when (I) market failure is present; (2) transfer of the use to defendant is socially
desirable; and (3) an award of fair use would not cause substantial injury to the incentives of
the plaintiff copyright owner." Id. at 1614.
6 Wendy J. Gordon, Excuse and Justification in the Law of Fair Use: Commodification
and Market Perspectives, in THE COMMODIFICATION OF INFORMATION: SOCIAL, POLITICAL,
AND CULTURAL RAMIFICATIONS 149 at 183-84 (Neil Netanel & Niva Elkin-Koren eds.)
(forthcoming 2002) [hereinafter Excuse and Justification].
7 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 659 F.2d 963, 970 (9th Cir. 1981),
rev'd, 464 U.S. 417 (1984). Although I agree with the Ninth Circuit that creative works
deserve special solicitude under the fair use doctrine, the doctrine's shelter should not be
restricted only to such works.
8 See Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure, supra note 2, at 1607-10 (discussing the work
ofCalabresi, Coase, Demsetz, Markovitz, Polinsky, Posner, and others).
9
Id. at 1627-35.
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by the significant benefits the educator generates without receiving
proportional reward: that is, the "positive externalities" he generates. A person
who is able to generate significant external benefits in this way may be capable
of producing a value-maximizing use of a copyrighted work, yet not have
enough funds to let him purchase a license for engaging in the use. 10 A court
interested in allowing the socially beneficial use to go forward may allow a
liberty outside the market. The doctrinal name for the liberty is "fair use."
Similarly, consider the preference within lhe fair use doctrine for defendants
who wish to use the copyrighted work for purposes of communicating ideas or
facts of high public import. Such a defendant's efforts are not only likely to
generate positive externalities of a monetary kind, but the public import may
also be of a type that is not calculable in monetary terms. I argued that
"nonmonetizable interest" should be added to "positive externality" as a
relevant form of market failure. 11
As another example, consider hostile uses of copyrighted works, such as
parodies or negative reviews. Such uses are likely to receive generous fair use
treatment. They too generate a kind of market failure: an unwillingness to
license at any cost. This is a form of market failure because such pricelessness
is a sign of strong "endowment effects." 12 In addition, our norms may require
us to reject the legitimacy of the owner's desire to suppress, which involves
rejecting the usual assumption of consumer sovereignty (that all desires are
equal) upon which economic analyses are usually premised. 13 Thus, the
See Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure, supra note 2, at 1630.
Id. at 1631-32. I strongly doubt that characterizing "nonmonetizable interest" as a
form of market failure originated with me, but I would be glad to defend the
characterization.
12 For my discussions of "endowment effect" in the context of fair use, see Gordon,
Excuse and Justification, supra note 6, at 169-77; Wendy J. Gordon, On the Economics of
Copyright, Restitution, and "Fair Use": Systemic Versus Case-By-Case Responses to
Market Failure, 8 J. L. & INFO. Sci. 7, 35-39 (1997); Wendy J. Gordon, Systemische und
fallbezogene Losungsansiitze for Marktversagen bei lmmaterialgiitern [Systemic and Caseby-Case Responses to Failures in Markets for Intangible Goods (Elisabeth Haberfellner
trans.), in OKONOMISCHE ANALYSE DER RECHTLICHEN ORGANISATION VON INNOVATIONEN,
BEITRAGE ZUM IV. TRAVEMUNDER SYMPOSIUM ZUR OKONOMISCHEN ANALYSE DES RECHTS,
328, 360-66 (Claus Ott & Hans-Bernd Schiifer eds., Verlag Mohr & Siebeck, Tiibingen
1994); Wendy J. Gordon, Toward a Jurisprudence of Benefits: The Norms of Copyright and
the Problem of Private Censorship, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1009, 1042 (1990) (book review).
The logic of endowment effect is this: the hostile use causes harm to reputation and peace of
mind. Reputation and peace of mind are "priceless" in the sense that they have high
endowment effects. If an author had a right to refuse permissions, she might not sell
licenses, even though, were the entitlement reversed, she might not be able to buy the user's
silence. In cases of high endowment effect, therefore, the "highest-valued use" can change
as entitlements change, and the market provides no stable guide to social value.
13
For a discussion of "anti-dissemination motives," see Gordon, Fair Use as Market
Failure, supra note 2, at 1632. The logic of anti-dissemination motives adds another
possibility to the list of market inadequacies: that although the market is neutral as between
IO

11
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presence of high transaction costs between copyright owner and potential user
is just another example of market failure. With this in mind, it seems ordinary
rather than exceptional that the fair use statute explicitly includes a form of
passive, consumer-type copying (making "multiple copies for classroom
use" 14 ), and that fair use customs (such as note-taking) do the same. For fair
use to embrace some forms of noncreative copying makes sense, provided
some reason to distrust the market is present.
Does my analysis suggest that if the Internet's promise of reducing
transaction costs is realized, fair use will disappear? Hardly. Note that none of
the other forms of market failure canvassed-such as positive externalities or
endowment effects-will diminish in a context where copyright owner and
user can bargain at low transaction cost. 15 Moreover, what I present here is
hardly an exhaustive list even of technical market failures. 16
I very much regret the way the market failure approach has grown-up, or
rather grown-down, since the publication of my original piece. Transaction
cost barriers are neither the only kind of economic problem to which fair use
responds, nor the only kind of problem to which fair use should respond.
Further, maximizing economic value "as measured by willingness to pay" 17 is
tastes (the taste for hats, the taste for suppression, the taste for discrimination), some tastes
and motives should not be recognized as valid. To value some tastes over others violates
"consumer sovereignty," but has quite respectable roots elsewhere. See, e.g., JOHN LOCKE,
Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 309 (Peter Laslett ed., 2d ed. 1967) (3d ed. 1698, corrected
by Locke) (refusing to give weight to objections based on "covetousness").
14
17 u.s.c. § 107 (2000).
15 This is a point well emphasized by Loren, supra note 4, at 26.
16 For another possible example of market failure, consider the problem of strategic
behavior in an anti-commons. See, e.g., Ben Depoorter & Francesco Parisi, Fair Use and
Copyright Protection: A Price Theory Explanation, 221 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 453, 458-59
(2002). Yet another issue that makes a difference for assessing fair use in the digital context
is privacy. To track a consumer's copying patterns for purposes of charging him money
could reveal a great deal that the consumer would prefer to keep private. This problem
could be characterized as a technical market failure (because, for example, the cost of
technologically or contractually eliminating dangers to privacy could be seen as a
transaction cost) or as a concern with alternative norms. As discussed further below, see
infra text accompanying notes 34-37 and Gordon, Excuse and Justification, supra note 6, at
165-75, it may be useful to distinguish between reasons to distrust the market that stem from
an inability to attain the technical conditions of perfect competition (because, for example,
significant transaction costs are present) and reasons to distrust the market that stem from
competing norms.
17 This is the definition of "value" from Richard Posner's early work: value is "human
satisfaction as measured by aggregate consumer willingness to pay for goods and services."
RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW I 0 (2d ed. 1977), cited in Gordon, Fair Use
as Market Failure, supra note 2, at 1606. For an approach to economics less used by
lawyers but more similar to that used by academic economists, see Louis Kaplow & Steven
Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961 (2001). As Kaplow and Shavell
point out, Judge Posner has himself amended his stance. See id. at 996 n.68.
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not the only norm that matters or should matter for fair use.
One factor contributing to the devolution of my market failure approach
may have been literalism: since the term is "market failure," it can connote a
complete failure of bargaining, perhaps calling up an image of owners and
users who cannot meet because of transaction cost barriers. However, "market
failure" has long been a term of art, employed not simply to denote actual
failures of markets to appear, but also to embrace the many other ways in
which real world market systems can fail to align private and social economic
welfare. (Also, I may have muddied the waters by attempting to use the term
even more broadly, to embrace ways in which real world markets can fail to
achieve even non-economic social goals. If so, my forthcoming essay offers a
solution-dividing the ways in which markets can fail into two types. 18)
Despite my decision to use "market failure" terminology, I do not think the
narrow view of fair use can be laid at my door. It is true that back in 1982,
when Fair Use as Market Failure was published, I had greater hopes for
intellectual property's use of both the efficiency norm and market institutions
than I do today.
Nevertheless, even in 1982, I was arguing that
nonmonetizable interests should count as a species of market failure, 19 thus
explicitly admitting that maximizing value, as measured by willingness to pay,
did not exhaust the relevant norms. A few years later, I was arguing that
endowment effects could make it meaningless to inquire into monetary
valuations, particularly for items that are tied to priceless goods such as
reputation. 20 About that time, I was also arguing that claims of justice gave
both authors 21 and the public 22 entitlements that were not fully dependent on
economics. I have, before and since, further explored the links between
consequentialist and non-consequentialist reasoning. 23 Moreover, in articles
18 I try to clarify the distinction between technical and normative market failure in
Gordon, Excuse and Justification, supra note 6, at 183-84, which is discussed further at
infra text accompanying notes 34-37.
19
Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure, supra note 2, at 1630-32.
20
See supra note 12 (describing the endowment effect). This is connected to the issue of
indivisibility: reputation and a license to quote one's work negatively may not be separable
goods.
21
Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in
the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1540-55 (1993); Wendy J.
Gordon, An Inquiry into the Merits of Copyright: The Challenges of Consistency, Consent
and Encouragement Theory, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1343, 1435-60 (1989).
22 Gordon, A Property Right in Self Expression, supra note 21, at 1535-40, 1555-72,
1578-09; Gordon, An Inquiry into the Merits of Copyright, supra note 21, ai 1460-65; see
also Wendy J. Gordon, Reality as Artifact: From Feist to Fair Use, 55 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 93, 100 (1992).
23
See, e.g., Jane C. Ginsburg, Wendy J. Gordon, Arthur R. Miller & William F. Patry,
The Constitutionality of Copyright Term Extension: How Long is Too Long?, 18 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 651, 674-86 (2000) (presentation by Gordon); Wendy J. Gordon, Norms of
Communication and Commodification, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2321 (1996); Gordon, A Property
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pursuing my continued interest in economics, I have expended a significant
number of electrons questioning whether exclusion rights of the property form
are really the best way to deal with prisoner's dilemma problems in
intangibles, 24 and a large part of my concern has been similar to Professor
Lunney's-the danger that the growth of propertarian models will cause us to
lose the promise that could otherwise inhere in inexhaustibility. 25 The promise
is not only one of increased dissemination: I have argued that inexhaustibility
can also help make practical the kind of affectional exchange and gratitude that
enlivens creative community and promotes trust and law-abidingness, 26 and (in
some circumstances) can "promote Progress"27 as well as, or better than,
monetary incentives. 28
"Market failure" is a key concept because the system of tort, property, and
contract that constitutes American law is predominantly a market system29 in
which it is hoped that private self-interest will operate in a way consistent with
the public's economic welfare. 30 The importance of "market failure" as a
concept is a virtual tautology: if our market system is usually supposed to
reconcile private and public goals, and if sometimes our courts or legislatures
create a privilege or limit a cause of action because the market system fails to
do some part of its task, "market failure" is an appropriate and useful
organizing device.
It is true, as Professor Lunney emphasizes, that our market system evolved

Right in Self-Expression, supra note 21, at 1608; Wendy J. Gordon, Truth and
Consequences: The Force of Blackmail's Central Case, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1741 (1993);
Gordon, Toward a Jurisprudence of Benefits, supra note 12, at I 026-46.
24 See, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon & Robert Bone, Copyright, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW &
ECONOMICS 189 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000); Wendy J. Gordon,
Authors, Publishers and Public Goods, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 159, 174-76 (2002)
(symposium on the Eldred case); see also Wendy J. Gordon, Intellectual Property As Price
Discrimination: Implications For Contract, 73 CHl.-KENT L. REv. 1367, 1370-72 (1998).
25 See, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon, On Owning Information: Intellectual Property and the
Restitutionary Impulse, 78 VA. L. REV. 149, 277-81 (1992).
26 See Gordon, Excuse and Justification, supra note 6, at 188-91 (also discussing choice
of remedy); Gordon, Authors, Publishers and Public Goods, supra note 24, at 184-88.
27 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
28 Gordon, Authors, Publishers and Public Goods, supra note 24, at 174-75, 184-88;
Wendy J. Gordon, Intellectual Property, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LEGAL STUDIES (Mark
Tushnet & Peter Cane, eds.) (forthcoming 2003).
29 Entitlements are given by the Jaw and traded by individuals. Prices serve as a signal to
direct resources to their highest-valued uses.
30
The notion that private self-interest in a perfect market will be consistent with the
public's economic welfare is usually traced to Adam Smith and is referred to by use of his
metaphor, "the invisible hand." ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES
OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 477 (Edwin Cannan ed., Univ. of Chicago Press 1976) (I 776)
(contending that the self-interested market actor in a competitive economy is "led by an
invisible hand to promote an end that which was no part of his intention").
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to take account of tangible and exhaustible goods. Yet, even for tangibles and
land, where allowing use without compensation is likely to hurt the owner, our
law limits the owner's causes of action and allows defenses in instances of
market failure. 31
Copyright and patent adopt this market system for application to intangible
goods, again with the hope of serving both private and public welfare. 32
Because of inexhaustibility, someone using an intangible does not necessarily
harm the owner. A fortiori, then, precisely as Professor Lunney says, when
dealing with intangibles there are even more grounds for limiting an owner's
cause of action or allowing defenses. My only puzzle is why Professor Lunney
thinks I disagree.
.
To inquire into "market failure" is simply to ask, when can we as a society
not safely rely on the bargain between owner and user to achieve social goals?
To realize that we cannot always reach these goals by automatic deference to
an owner is hardly to embrace economic efficiency as the only norm. To the
contrary, it must be recognized that efficiency is just one way in which private
and social goals can converge. As my more recent work makes explicit, when
efficiency is unattainable, or other evidence exists that appropriate goals
cannot be served by deferring to an owner, it may be appropriate for a court to
refuse to enforce an otherwise relevant property right. 33
As mentioned, in a recent article I suggest that it might be useful to divide
market failures (and fair use) into two categories. 34 In one category belong
"technical failures" that prevent perfect competition from arising. These
failures might result from the presence of, for example, endowment effects,
high transaction costs between owner and user, transaction costs that prevent a
user from internalizing the social benefit she generates, indivisible products,
and strategic behavior. The category of technical market failure corresponds to
the way many economists use the notion of "market failure." A second
category addresses all the normative reasons why we might not want to rely on
the market, such as dissatisfaction with the pursuit of economic value.
I use the term "excuse" to denominate the category of technical market
failure. The absence of permission and payment is excused because of special
circumstances,35 but the goal remains the furtherance of economic welfare. By
31

A classic work on this foundational point is Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed,
Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L.
REV. 1089 (1972).
32
Intellectual property law grants exclusive rights in the hope that the deadweight loss
caused by the grant of exclusivity will be lower than the value of increased creative works
drawn forth.
33
See Gordon, Excuse and Justification, supra note 6, at 156.
34 Id.
35

A circumstance that triggers "excuse" can arise whenever reality fails to conform to
the assumptions underlying the "invisible hand." See supra note 30. This failure can occur
at a quite general level. For example, imagine we could identify a species of author or
innovator who does not respond as homo economicus would, but who instead is indifferent
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contrast, I use the tenn "justification" to denominate the category where the
importance of non-economic norms makes us distrust the market. To find a
use "justified" is to have concluded that, whether or not the technical
conditions of perfect competition happen to be present, the user's failure to pay
or failure to obtain pennission 36 in the particular context is something that
should be emulated. Both technical and nonnative market failures, excuse and
justification, are instances in which we cannot trust the market system of
ordinary property, tort, and contract to achieve desired goals.
Professor Lunney says that many interpret the Sony case as implementing a
transaction cost approach. If this interpretation is accurate, then under my new
taxonomy the case would be an instance of technical market failure, or
"excused" fair use. However, I agree with Professor Lunney that the writers of
the Sony opinion did not frame their decision as determined by the transaction
cost issue. 37
Under conditions of either excuse or justification, absence of permission
from an owner, and a lack of payment to him, 38 can be affirmatively desirable.
Identifying these conditions-and applying the resulting insights both to the
fair use doctrine and beyond it-is one of the major tasks facing Intellectual
Property scholarship.
Economics provides many important tools for
identifying and analyzing IP contexts in which the market should be
disfavored. 39 So do sociology, psychology, literary theory and a number of
other disciplines.
Work on this crucial task is already well begun. Rebecca Eisenberg and

to monetary incentives. That would give rise to an instance of "excuse": with such persons
as market actors, we could not trust the market to achieve maximum welfare. Of course,
were reality to diverge this sharply from the economist's ordinary assumptions, the market
might no longer be the best institutional concept with which to begin analysis. See infra text
accompanying note 46 (discussing the commons as an alternative starting place for
analysis).
36
Permission and payment are, of course, quite different issues. See e.g., Gordon,
Excuse and Justification, supra note 6, at 158-72 (distinguishing among the desirability of
the defendant's behavior, the desirability of the defendant's not having obtained consent,
and the desirability of the defendant's not having paid compensation); id. at 188-91
(discussing special problems presented by limiting copyright owners to a money-only
remedy); Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure, supra note 2, at 1622-24 (discussing whether
judicially-imposed compulsory licenses could provide an alternative to fair use).
37
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
38
See supra note 36.
39
It should be remembered that the market is only one of many institutional forms
through which persons can seek maximize economic welfare. The firm is another such
institution. R.H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET AND THE LAW (1988); R.H. Coase, The
Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937). So, too, in appropriate contexts, is a
commons. See, e.g., Yochai Benkler, Coase's Penguin, or Linux and The Nature of the
Firm, 112 YALE L.J. (forthcoming December 2002) (on file with author); sources cited infra
note 45.
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Arti Kaur Rai in the realm of basic science,40 Lewis Hyde in regard to the arts
(particularly literature), 41 Thomas Mandeville in the area of information
economics, 42 and Y ochai Benkler in the field of institutional economics
(particularly as applied to computer software), 43 have each valuably pointed to
areas and ways in which individuals and society can benefit less from a
monetary market than they could from a flow of information and works
unimpeded by toll booths.
Professor Lunney's emphasis on the value of inexhaustibility contributes
valuably to this new direction. 44 We are learning continually more about the
values and behaviors fostered by relationships of gift (Hyde), the conflicts
between scientific norms and exclusivity (Eisenberg and Rai), the ways in
which highly uncodified information is transmitted (Mandeville), the workings
of "commons-based peer production" (Benkler), and the other ways and
contexts in which a lack of exclusivity may be a delight rather than a tragedy. 45
Eventually we will develop a systematic set of tools for recognizing those
areas in which the better starting place for analysis is not the market but a type
of commons. 46 Until then, it is useful to begin with the model of the marketa model whose workings and virtues we know relatively well. In that
endeavor, market failure remains the central organizing trope. We simply must
be sure to include within it all the ways in which markets can let us down.

40

Arti Kaur Rai, Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the
Norms of Science, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 77 (1999); Rebecca Eisenberg, Patents and the
Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017
( 1989); Rebecca Eisenberg, Proprietary Rights and the Norms of Science in Biotechnology
Research, 97 YALE L.J. 177 (1987).
41
LEWIS HYDE, THE GIFT: IMAGINATION AND THE EROTIC LIFE OF PROPERTY (1983).
42 Thomas Mandeville, An Information Economics Perspective on Innovation, 25 INT'L J.
Soc. ECON. 357 (1988), reprinted in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: THE INTERNATIONAL
LIBRARY OF ESSAYS IN LAW AND LEGAL THEORY, SECOND SERIES 41 (Peter Drahos ed.,
1999).
43 Benkler, supra note 39.
44
See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
45
See, e.g., Peter Drahos, Introduction to INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: THE INTERNATIONAL
LIBRARY OF ESSAYS IN LAW AND LEGAL THEORY, SECOND SERIES, at xiv-xix (Peter Drahos
ed., 1999); Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition
from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621 (1998); Frank L. Michelman, Ethics,
Economics and the Law of Property, in ETHICS, ECONOMICS, AND THE LAW 3 (J. Roland
Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1982); Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons:
Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711 (1986); David
Lange, Recognizing the Public Domain, 44 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 147, 147-48, 171-78
(1981); see also Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965 (1990).
46
For further discussion, see Wendy J. Gordon, Intellectual Property, in OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF LEGAL STUDIES (Mark Tushnet & Peter Cane eds.) (forthcoming 2003).
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